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Labored Law: Bilateralism or Pluralism,  
Ossification or Reformation?
†
 
JOHN N. RAUDABAUGH
*
 
The form of the question reflects extensive study among scholars, limited debate 
among elected officials, and claims from organized labor and their supporters of 
“Workers’ Rights Under Attack,” “Middle Class at Risk,” a “Human Rights 
Crisis,” and a “September Massacre.”1 In 1953, “organized labor” (“Labor”) 
represented 35.7% of the private-sector U.S. workforce.
2
 Labor’s downhill slide to 
its current 6.9% membership density is due to many factors: a changing workplace, 
new technologies, generational changes, globalization, employer concern for 
operating flexibility, burgeoning federal and state employment legislation and 
regulation, and a host of human and institutional failures.
3
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 1. For representative scholarship, see, e.g., Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker 
Participation Is Required in a Declining Union Environment to Provide Employees with 
Meaningful Industrial Democracy, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135 (1997); Ellen Dannin, NLRA 
Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223 (2005); 
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for 
Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1992); Cynthia L. Estlund, 
The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002); Katherine V.W. 
Stone, The Future of Labor and Employment Law in the United States (UCLA Sch. of Law, 
Law & Econ Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 08-11, 2008). For representative claims, see, e.g., 
George Miller, Senior Democratic Member, Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, U.S. House 
of Representatives, Workers’ Rights Under Attack by Bush Administration: President Bush’s 
National Labor Relations Board Rolls Back Labor Protections (July 13, 2006), available at 
http://www.apwu.org/issues-efca/nlrb_report071306.pdf; Press Release, AFL-CIO, 
Statement by AFL-CIO President John Sweeney on Wilma Liebman Appointment as NLRB 
Chair (Jan. 26, 2009), available at http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/ 
pr01262009.cfm; Press Release, AFL-CIO, Statement by AFL-CIO President Richard 
Trumka on Department of Labor Notice of Employee Rights Rule (May 20, 2010), available 
at http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/pr05202010.cfm. 
 2. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership, Coverage, Density, 
and Employment Among Private Sector Workers, 1973–2010, UNIONSTATS (2011), 
http://unionstats.gsu.edu/Private%20Sector%20workers.htm; see also Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, The Changing Face of Collective Representation: The Future of Collective 
Bargaining, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 903 (2007); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Death of Labor 
Law? (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper 
No. 06-16, 2006). 
 3. Id. 
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Organized labor, as we know it, is fighting for its institutional life, to be the sole 
form of worker voice in an adversarial legal regime, and to recapture a historic 
density likely unachievable.
4
 The reported prospects for a return to higher union 
densities are dim, reflecting a variety of factors, most notably the changed structure of 
the economy with employment shifting away from sectors where unions were 
historically strongest.
5
 And, the more competitive an industry, the less likely it can 
sustain a sizeable union premium.
6
 It is unlikely that owners of capital will be 
indifferent between investing in the union and nonunion sectors, given the union 
cost premiums and restrictions on operating flexibility. 
Despite these many factors and impediments to increasing union density, unions 
won 68.6% of representation case elections conducted by the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) in fiscal year 2009.
7
 Yet it is the number of victories by 
whatever means—secret ballot elections or voluntary recognitions—that is the 
objective. The real question now is whether union density/leverage can be 
markedly enhanced by calculated changes to NLRB decisional law and through 
regulatory initiatives given the recent failed effort for legislative relief.
8
 
According to interviews of union organizers from a sample of 407 NLRB 
certification elections during 1998–99, in units of fifty or more eligible voters, 
plant closings and alleged threats of closings resulted in lower union election win 
rates.
9
 But the unions involved reportedly filed fewer charges with the NLRB 
because (a) they believed the union would achieve its first contract so filing was 
unnecessary; (b) they thought the case was not strong enough to win; and (c) they felt 
that they would lose the unit anyway because of a plant closing, decertification, or 
inability to get the employer to the bargaining table. .
10
 For these reasons, and based 
on comments of union organizers, card check recognition rather than board elections 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. See generally Andy Stern, Labor’s New Deal, THE NATION, Apr. 7, 2008, at 26. 
 5. Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the 
Private Sector, 1973–1998, 22 J. LAB. RES. 459, 467 (2001). 
 6. Barry T. Hirsch, Reconsidering Union Wage Effects: Surveying New Evidence on an 
Old Topic 33 (Inst. for the Stud. of Lab., Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 795, 2003); 
Barry T. Hirsch & Edward J. Schumacher, Private Sector Union Density and the Wage 
Premium: Past, Present, and Future, 22 J. LAB. RES. 487, 495 (2001); Richard Vedder & 
Lowell Gallaway, The Economic Effects of Labor Unions Revisited, 23 J. LAB. RES. 105, 128 
(2002); Michael L. Wachter, Judging Unions’ Future Using a Historical Perspective: The 
Public Policy Choice Between Competition and Unionization, 24 J. LAB. RES. 339 (2003). 
 7. NLRB, SEVENTY FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD 125–27 tbl.13 (2009). 
 8. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, Local Union No. 1506, 355 
N.L.R.B. 159 (2010); Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); 
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 509, 111th Cong. (2009); NLRB: Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 36812 (proposed June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 
101–03). 
 9. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on 
Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing. Part II: First Contract Supplement, RES. 
STUDY & REP. (June 1, 2001), at 12–17 (submitted to the U.S. Trade Deficit Rev. 
Comm’n, June 1, 2001). 
 10. Id. at 14. 
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and first contract arbitration rather than collective bargaining have been 
recommended.
11
 
Another “studied” attack on the NLRB’s undermining of employee rights to 
organize evaluated sixty-two Chicago-area campaigns in 2002 and interviews with 
twenty-five lead organizers and eleven anonymous employees.
12
 The findings 
reported that 30% of the employers allegedly fired workers for engaging in union 
activities, 49% threatened to close or relocate, and 82% used consultants to aid the 
employers’ fight against union activities.13 Reportedly, unions were hesitant to file 
charges where evidence may be insufficient, the election date may be delayed, and 
make-whole remedies or 10(j) injunctive relief
14
 may be lacking.
15
 
Organized labor and its academy have forever argued that the 1935 National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended,
16
 made the choice of “union yes” 
insulated from employer speech because the union “election” is not a civic election 
and, therefore, employers have no right or reason to comment or participate.
17
 
Labor and their advocates have long called for changes to the NLRA and refused to 
acknowledge or accept the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendment, section 8(c),
18
 which 
specifically addresses and implicitly endorses the right of employers, in addition to 
labor organizations, to express views, argument, and opinion in any form. But, 
fundamentally, labor must acknowledge that 
[t]he decision whether or not to support a union depends fundamentally 
on three questions: Are the conditions within the plant unsatisfactory? 
To what extent can the union improve on these conditions? Will 
representation by the union bring countervailing disadvantages as a 
result of dues payments, strikes, or bitterness within the plant?
19
 
And, organized labor and its supporters must admit that “free choice” necessarily 
requires informed choice and the absence of pressure, promises, threats, or 
coercion. Card checks cannot and do not guarantee or ensure either free or 
informed choice.
20
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See id. at 57–58. 
 12. See CHIRAG MEHTA & NIK THEODORE, CTR. FOR URB. ECON. DEV., UNDERMINING THE 
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE: EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR DURING UNION REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGNS 27 
(2005).  
 13. Id. at 5. 
 14. 29 U.S.C. § 10(j) (2006) authorizes the NLRB to petition any district court of the United 
States to seek temporary relief or a restraining order. 
 15. MEHTA & THEODORE, supra note 12, at 17. 
 16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006); Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 141–88 (1947); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (1959). 
 17. See GORDON LAFER, NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR: THE SUBVERSION OF DEMOCRACY 
UNDER NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ELECTIONS (2007). 
 18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006). 
 19. Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 49 (1964). 
 20. Chris Riddell, Union Certification Success Under Voting Versus Card-Check 
Procedures: Evidence from British Columbia 1978–1998, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 493, 
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Given employers’ property rights enabling their onsite communication with their 
employees, including “captive” audience meetings, unions counter with home visits 
and stealth campaigns to prevent or delay employer awareness of union 
organizing.
21
 Covert campaigning enables unions to be the sole provider of 
information, or at least to minimize employer “air time,” to enhance success in 
obtaining signed cards enabling voluntary recognition or election petition filing with the 
NLRB. The proposed Employee Free Choice Act of 2009 (EFCA) would have 
effectively stripped employers of their statutory right of speech guaranteeing uninformed 
employee choice; ensured at least some degree of intrusion, coercion, or even threats to 
sign a card; and eliminated any secret ballot election by making union recognition 
mandatory when presented with a card majority.
22
 Adding to the significance of 
organized labor’s tactics to capture representative status by controlling information is the 
NLRA’s antiquated architecture offering but a single option to allow any negotiation or 
dealing between employees and employers regarding wages, hours, and working 
conditions—third-party majority representation or no bargaining, no dealing, nothing.23 
But even with majority representation, does labor deliver? Unions argue that 
achieving a first contract is difficult. Impediments to achieving first contracts are 
NLRB delays in resolving post-election objections and challenges, post-election 
employer discrimination, employer refusals to bargain, prolonged hard bargaining, 
and strikes.
24
 Notably, strikes played a role in 23% of negotiations ultimately 
resulting in agreement and in 26% of failed negotiations.
25
 And, the overwhelming 
majority of union-represented employees never participated in any election 
regarding choice of union representative or whether to be represented at all.
26
 
Prompting much debate regarding first contract negotiations is Weiler’s study 
testing his hypothesis on the negative effect of deficiencies in the law.
27
 In a review of 
271 election certifications in units of 100 employees or more between 1979 and 
1981, Weiler found 172, or 63%, achieved a first contract.
28
 Weiler rejects interest 
arbitration as a remedy for bargaining impasse because it collides with the principle 
of free collective bargaining, but he would consider it as a special remedy for failure to 
bargain.
29
 Weiler acknowledges the Supreme Court's emphasis on the fundamental 
policy of freedom of contract and the Act’s admonition that agreement to a proposal 
or the making of a concession is not required.
30
 
                                                                                                                 
498 (2004). 
 21. Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules 
of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010). 
 22. S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 158(a)(2) (2006); Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 
(1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994); E.I. DuPont & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 
(1993). 
 24. William N. Cooke, The Failure to Negotiate First Contracts: Determinants and 
Policy Implications, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 163, 176 (1985); Paul Weiler, Striking a 
New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 351, 377, 404, 408–10 (1984).  
 25. Cooke, supra note 24. 
 26. 157 CONG. REC. S5265 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 27. Weiler, supra note 24.  
 28. Id.at 354 n.5. 
 29. Id. at 372–405. 
 30. Id. at 358, 362. 
2012] LABORED LAW 109 
 
In response to Weiler, LaLonde and Meltzer argue that estimates of employers’ 
refusals to bargain first contracts are too high and reject the “rogue employer” 
thesis.
31
 Their research of random samples of Board decisions from 1955 and 1980 
disputes the NLRB General Counsel’s 1978 claim that 90% of 29 U.S.C. § 8(a)(3) 
charges arise out of organizing campaigns and that one in twenty union supporters are 
discharged during a campaign.
32
 
The question of whether employee rights are protected relative to initial collective 
agreements implicitly suggests that failure at obtaining first contracts violates 
employee rights. But the NLRA does not guarantee or mandate contract outcomes: 
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have 
selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort 
them to the door of the employer and say, “Here they are, the legal 
representatives of your employees.” What happens behind those doors is 
not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.
33
 
Additional remedies of the kind that were contemplated in the EFCA would 
require amending section 10(c) of the NLRA and raise due process concerns given 
the current absence of NLRB pre-hearing discovery.
34
 And, rectifying such due 
process issues will inevitably lead to further delays in dispute resolution, election 
scheduling, or first contracts.
35
 The recent trend for states to intrude into the arena of 
labor law is also problematic, raising the specter of conflicting rigidities, inflexibilities, 
and costs imposed on employers and market competitiveness.
36
 
To do anything to force first contracts, including interest arbitration, contravenes 
the NLRA and destroys freedom of contract. It’s hard to imagine such a 
revolutionary outcome in civil law. Even Weiler, a pro-Canadian labor law admirer, 
acknowledges that “if the cause of union decline is rejection by American workers of 
the institution, there is nothing that the law can or should do about that verdict.”37 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at 
the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 959, 990–1003 (1991). 
 32. Id. at 986. 
 33. Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1402 
(1958) (quoting 79 CONG. REC. 7660 (statement of Sen. Walsh)). 
 34. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006). See generally JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RES. 
SERV., RS21887, THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT (2011). 
 35. Letter from Karen R. Harned, Executive Director, National Federation of 
Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, to Lester A. Heltzer, Executive 
Secretary, National Labor Relations Board 5 (August 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NLRB-2011-0002-28124; see also NLRB: 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 36812 (proposed June 22, 2011) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101–03) (seriously compromising due process in attempting to 
conduct elections “speedily”). 
 36. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product 
Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1993); Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-
Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209 (2008). 
 37. Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1015, 1018 (1991). Contra, Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1. 
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“The decline of unions is largely due to economic pressures that the law can hardly 
control or withstand.”38 The explanation for union decline “lies primarily in natural 
market forces: structural changes in the American economy, increased domestic and 
foreign competition; and, yes, even increased employee opposition to private 
unionization.”39 And, internal bureaucracies and politics add to the mix of 
successes and failures as well.
40
 
The administration of the NLRA rests with the NLRB.
41
 Reflecting, in part, 
organized labor’s decline, caseload has atrophied over time. NLRB members issued 
2606 decisions in FY 1981 but only 368 decisions in FY 2011.
42
 During FY 1981, 
55,897 cases were filed with the NLRB.
43
 The NLRB received 25,022 cases in FY 
2011.
44
 The NLRB’s funding for FY 1981 was $118,488,000 and $284,400,000 for 
FY 2011 (or $113,760,000 in 1981 constant dollars).
45
 Despite a 55% decline in 
case intake and an 85.9% decline in case output, agency funding in constant dollars 
declined only 39.9%, and the NLRB continues to maintain fifty-one regional and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Keith N. Hylton, Law and the Future of Organized Labor in America 10 (Boston 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper Series, Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 03-14, 2003). 
 39. Leo Troy, Market Forces and Union Decline: A Response to Paul Weiler, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 681, 682 (1992) (emphasis omitted). 
 40. See, e.g., Bob King and UAW Leadership Undermine R&F Union Power at the Big 
Three, FACTS FOR WORKING PEOPLE (Sept. 22, 2011), http://weknowwhatsup.blogspot.com/ 
2011/09/bob-king-and-uaw-leadership-undermine.html; Steve Early, Whither Change to 
Win?, IN THESE TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011, 1:20 PM), http://www.inthesetimes.com/ 
working/entry/12074/whither_change_to_win/; Thomas B. Edsall, Two Top Unions Split 
from AFL–CIO: Others Are Expected to Follow Teamsters, WASH. POST, July 25, 2005, at 
A1; Chris Kutalik, What Does the AFL–CIO Split Mean?,” LABORNOTES (Sept. 1, 2005 
12:00 AM), http://labornotes.org/node/776; David Macary, Back Up the Aisle? AFL–CIO 
and Change to Win in “Re-Wed” Talks, COUNTERPUNCH (Feb. 6–8, 2009), 
http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/02/06/afl-cio-and-change-to-win-in-quot-re-wed-quot-
talks/; David Moberg, Has the Change Led to Wins?: Not Yet, but Organizers from the Seven 
Unions that Split from the AFL-CIO Have Big Plans, IN THESE TIMES (Oct. 24, 2007), 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3379/has_the_change_led_to_wins/; Ben Smith, UNITE 
HERE Talks Collapse, POLITICO (Apr. 30, 2009), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0409/UNITE_HERE_talks_collapse.html; Ben 
Smith, SEIU Bid on UNITE HERE, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2009), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0209/SEIU_bid_on_UNITE_HERE.html?showall; 
UAW Leadership Picks King Next Union President, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2009, 7:14 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/17/uaw-king-idUSN1611413620091217. 
 41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153–56 (2006). 
 42. NLRB, FORTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
19 (1981); NLRB, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 3 (2011). 
 43. NLRB, FORTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
1 (1981). 
 44. NLRB, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 44 (2011). 
 45. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, CONCERNS REGARDING IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE CHARGES 
AGAINST EMPLOYERS FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, GAO/HRD-82-80 29 (1982); NLRB, 
FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 73 (2011); CPI Calculator, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=1&year1= 
1981&year2=2011. 
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subregional offices and one headquarters office.
46
 Much has been written over the 
years regarding NLRB delay in decision making and infamous decisional flip-
flopping regarding statutory interpretation challenging judicial deference and 
challenging alleged agency “expertise.”47 As with other federal employment law 
statutory structures, Congress should consider channeling NLRA disputes to an 
Article III court or even create a specialized Article III court for all federal 
workplace law issues.  
According to one critic, “labor laws . . . have become nearly irrelevant[] to the 
vast majority of private-sector American workers.”48 Whether by globalization, 
structural economic change, increased employer resistance given decreased union 
density and corresponding economic leverage, unions’ own complacency, or 
traditional adversarial unionism, 92% of the private-sector workforce is not part of 
the legislated structure for industrial peace.
49
 
Unions cannot survive if their employer “hosts” fail, yet employers can thrive 
without unions.
50
 Given this economic reality for standoff, must American workers 
be left with “It is what it is . . . . Take it or leave it”? In this day and time, should the 
choice be only full-fledged majority representation in an adversarial top-down paradigm 
or no collective voice of any other kind?
51
 The NLRA’s section 8(a)(2) prohibition 
on “any organization of any kind” which “deal[s] with” employers denies millions 
of fellow citizens a constructive voice at work.
52
 
Traditional union governance regularizes and codifies worker tasks 
within a top-down command structure. In contrast, modern workplaces 
typically require interaction and two-way communications between 
workers and supervisors, accompanied by the use of bottom-up worker and 
managerial discretion that takes advantage of site-specific information. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. NLRB, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 6 (2011). 
 47. See, e.g., Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Estlund, supra note 2; 
Estlund, supra note 1; Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for 
Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1985); David L. Gregory, The National Labor 
Relations Board and the Politics of Labor Law, 27 B.C. L. REV. 39 (1985); William S. 
Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly 
Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 
94 NW. U. L. REV. 393 (2000). 
 48. Estlund, supra note 1, at 1528. 
 49. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership, Coverage, Density, 
and Employment Among Private Sector Workers, 1973–2010, UNIONSTATS (2011), 
http://unionstats.gsu.edu/Private%20Sector%20workers.htm.  
 50. Estlund, supra note 1, at 1543. 
 51. Id.; see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private 
Sector Unionism: What Next for the NLRA? (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper 
Series, Paper No. 2362, 2006). 
 52. 29 U.S.C. § 152(a)(5); see also, Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), 
enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994); E.I. DuPont & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993). 
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In contemporary workplaces, job hierarchies are often not clear-cut and 
worker decision-making is essential at most levels.
53
 
Traditional unionism under the NLRA serves as bargaining leverage in an 
adversarial model. Even accepting the questionable assertion that 53% of the 
nonunion workforce wants traditional unionism, 47% are left with nothing under 
the NLRA.
54
 Certainly the 90% of the private workforce who are not unionized are 
not well served by the current system offering the choice of confrontation or 
nothing but rare, random, and legally limited opportunities for watered-down 
worker voice and participation.
55
 It is this absence of any lawful, robust, employee 
voice alternative to a seventy-six-year-old third-party-only option that truly restricts 
human rights in the United States.
56
 
The Dunlop Commission’s first goal for the twenty-first century workplace was 
to “[e]xpand coverage of employee participation and labor-management 
partnerships to more workers, more workplaces, and to more issues and decisions.”57 
Labor policy should be modernized to offer workers/employees/colleagues/citizens 
what they want and what the economy needs.
58
 The Teamwork for Employees and 
Managers Act
59
 would have made a positive adjustment. While good for some, we 
must remember that “[t]he dramatically reduced role played by unions and 
collective bargaining in the U.S. private economy is hardly attributable solely or even 
primarily to the workings of the legal regime.”60 Yes, workers’ rights are protected in 
the NLRB representation election process. And yes, workers’ rights are protected 
during initial contract bargaining recognizing the fundamental policy of the freedom 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 51, at 9 (citations omitted). See generally Bruce E. 
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Freeman, Do Workers Still Want Unions? More than Ever 2 (Econ. Pol’y Inst., EPI Briefing 
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=4787&chapter=3&query=%28%28United+States%29%29+%40ref&highlight=&querytype
=bool&context=0; LANCE A. COMPA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A STRANGE CASE: 
VIOLATIONS OF WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES BY EUROPEAN 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 11–12 (2010); LANCE COMPA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 19–43 (2000). 
 57. U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, THE DUNLOP 
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of contract. However, “[t]he current legal regime is based on a model of the 
employment relationship that poorly reflects modern conditions . . . . [T]he focus of 
legislative efforts should be on lifting existing restrictions that limit representational 
options and encourage adversarial contests.”61 
Federal labor law must be supplemented to also embrace a modern 
“participatory self-governance” model allowing employees and employers to 
discuss any and all matters of interest.
62
 Today’s workplace should be “allowed” to 
engage employees and take advantage of mediation, arbitration, and expanded 
corporate social responsibility and governance, and be on equal footing with the 
other option-exclusive representation under the NLRA’s adversarial or 
confrontational regime.
63
 Let workers/employees/colleagues/citizens decide which 
option is best for them. And, undoubtedly, a century from now further remodeling 
with additional options will be required. 
It is time to decide. Do we keep what we have, refine what we have, or expand 
our options? Adjustments to federal labor laws are long overdue. For example: 
1. Amend NLRA section 8(a)(2) by inserting:  
“Provided further, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an 
unfair labor practice under this paragraph for any employer to establish, 
assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, 
in which employees participate to at least the same extent practicable as 
representatives of management participate, to address matters of mutual 
interest, including, but not limited to, issues of quality, productivity, 
efficiency, and safety and health, and which does not have, claim, or 
seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the 
employees or to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining 
agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective 
bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor 
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organization, except that in a case in which a labor organization is the 
representative of such employees as provided in section 9(a), this 
proviso shall not apply,” and by adding a new sub-section (4) to read: 
“Nothing in this Act shall affect employee rights and responsibilities 
contained in provisions other than Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor 
Relations Act, as amended.”64 
 
This proposal is key to expanding voice and participatory options. 
 
2. Amend NLRA Section 8(b)(1) by inserting “interfere with” to read:  
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents 
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed in section 157. . . .” 
 
This proposal would finally equate restrictions on labor organizations 
with the same longstanding restrictions against employers. It is critical 
to acknowledge that in 2008, there were just over 29.5 million 
businesses in the United States of which businesses with fewer than 
500 employees comprised 99.9% of the 29.5 million businesses.
65
 
International labor organizations and their affiliates are large 
institutions employing hundreds of employees, managing hundreds of 
millions of dollars, and maintaining skilled personnel and legal 
departments. Labor organizations are in the business of organizing and 
representing employees and should be subject to the same legal 
restraints as employers. 
 
3. Amend NLRA Section 9(b) by adding “prior to an election” after “in 
each case.” 
 
This proposal would protect due process rights of employers and unions 
and employees. 
 
4. Amend NLRA Section 9(c) by inserting “of 14 days in advance” 
following “appropriate hearing upon due notice”, “and a review of 
post-hearing appeals” following “the record of such hearing” and at the 
end of sub-section, “No election shall be conducted less than 40 
calendar days following the filing of an election petition. The employer 
shall provide the Board a list of employee names and home addresses 
of all eligible voters within seven (7) days following the Board’s 
determination of the appropriate unit or following any agreement 
between the employer and the labor organization regarding the eligible 
voters,” a new subsection (6)(A) to read: 
 
“No election shall take place after the filing of any petition unless and 
until (i) a hearing is conducted before a qualified hearing officer in 
accordance with due process on any and all material, factual issues 
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regarding jurisdiction, statutory coverage, appropriate unit, unit 
inclusion or exclusion, or eligibility of individuals; and (ii) the issues 
are resolved by a Regional Director, subject to appeal and review, or by 
the Board.” 
 
A new subsection (6)(B) to read: 
 
“No election results shall be final and no labor organization shall be 
certified as the bargaining representative of the employees in an 
appropriate unit unless and until the Board has ruled on (i) each pre-
election issue not resolved before the election; and (ii) the Board 
conducts a hearing in accordance with due process and resolves each 
issue pertaining to the conduct or results of the election.” 
 
This proposal would ensure due process in representation case 
procedures contrary to the NLRB’s current proposed rule.66 
 
5. Amend NLRA Section 9(e) by adding a new subsection (3) to read:  
“Every thirty-six (36) months following initial certification of a labor 
organization as the exclusive representative of employees in an 
appropriate bargaining unit, the Board shall conduct a secret ballot 
election among such employees to determine whether a majority desire 
to continue to be represented by such labor organization. The election 
shall be conducted without regard to the pendency of any unfair labor 
practice charge against the employer and the Board shall rule on any 
objections to the election. If a majority of votes cast reject continuing 
representation by the labor organization, the Board shall certify the 
results of the election. 
 
This proposal would provide an interference-free method for unit 
represented employees who never participated in any vote or card 
signing or voluntary recognition process to select and designate their 
representative. 
 
6. Amend NLRA Section 13 by adding:  
“provided no strike shall commence without a majority secret ballot 
vote of all employees affected to be conducted by the American 
Arbitration Association or a comparable, neutral, private organization. 
The cost of the election shall be borne by the labor organization and the 
Board shall rule on any objections to the election.” 
 
This proposal would ensure that all represented employees have the 
right to vote on strike action. 
 
7. Amend LMRDA Section 101(a)(1) by inserting at the end: 
“Every employee in a bargaining unit represented by a labor 
organization shall have the same right as members to vote by secret 
ballot regarding whether to ratify a collective bargaining agreement 
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with or to engage in a strike or refusal to work of any kind against their 
employer.” 
 
This proposal would ensure all employees represented by a labor 
organization have the right to vote on strike action and whether to ratify 
a negotiated bargaining agreement. 
 
8. Amend LMRDA Section 101(a)(3) by inserting: 
“No member’s dues, fees, or assessments or other contributions shall be 
used or contributed to any person, organization, or entity for any 
purpose not germane to the union’s collective bargaining or contract 
administration functions unless the member authorizes such 
expenditure in writing.” 
 
This proposal would ensure that no employee’s dues and fees and 
assessments paid to the labor organization would be used for any 
purposes other than local bargaining and grievance or arbitration 
representation without the express, written approval of the employee. 
 
9. Amend LMRDA Section 610 by inserting new sub-sections (b) and 
(c) to read: 
“(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through the use of force or 
violence, or threat of the use of force or violence, to restrain, coerce, or 
intimidate, or attempt to restrain, coerce, or intimidate any person for 
the purpose of obtaining from any person any right to represent 
employees or any compensation or other term or condition of 
employment. Any person who willfully violates this sub-section shall 
be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned for not more than ten 
(10) years, or both. 
(c) The lawfulness of a labor organization’s objectives does not remove 
or exempt conduct by the labor organization or its agents that otherwise 
constitutes extortion as defined by 18 U.S.C. Section 1951(b)(2) from 
the definition of extortion.” 
 
This proposal strengthens prohibitions against any use of force or 
violence or threat thereof for achieving lawful or unlawful objectives 
thereby resolving the undercutting of the Hobbs Act by the decision in 
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973). 
CONCLUSION 
Additional study is unnecessary. As to what institution will be effective “to 
minimize the randomness of fortune of democratic capitalism . . . [and] . . . will 
stand effectively as a counterweight in our democracy to the growing political 
influence of corporations[,]” the answer is you, me, and our fellow 
worker/employee/colleague/citizen if we are permitted to do so.
67
 Recognizing the 
wide array of workplaces, jobs, age groups, educational backgrounds, and 
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globalization, among other variables, old New Deal third-party majority 
representation “voice” or no voice at all regarding wages, hours of work, and 
working conditions is untenable. Keep, if you will, the industrial-age, combative, 
third-party-union-voice form with its companion, the vacillating adjudication of 
labor’s politicized “expert” Board, or, better yet, replace it with an Article III 
workplace law court, but proceed now to legalize and embrace an array of creative 
voice forms and governance models, allow and promote employee engagement, and 
utilize dispute resolution when required. 
One option only, and a well-worn one at that, misses the mark. Yes, this too 
shall pass,
68
 but only if we get on with it. 
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